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Juan Pablo Serra 
What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be?Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship  
Abstract. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it offers a summary compilation of the 
main achievements in recent scholarship on the issue of pragmatic ethics —underlining 
the lack of consensus, but also showing basic agreement about the key features of the 
ethical philosophy of pragmatism. Second, it focus on two strands of pragmatism: the one 
spearheaded by Charles S. Peirce, which stresses the importance of habits, and the ten-
dency of things (including human beings) to become habit-governed as the key to the de-
velopment of ‘concrete reasonableness’, the ultimate end by which human action ought to 
be guided; and the one led by John Dewey, which stresses the importance of deliberative 
activity —a ‘dramatic rehearsal’ of the possible consequences of every course of action— 
and the central role of educational work in developing the ‘growth’ of human nature, in it-
self the highest ethical ideal —an ideal that manifests itself in the ‘reconstruction’ of a 




At the beginning of the last decade, Richard Bernstein (1992) wrote about the resur-
gence of pragmatism in the Anglo-American academic world; since that time, it has be-
come almost a cliché to note the significance that American philosophical thought has ac-
quired in areas of culture as diverse as sociology, law, political science, literature and phi-
losophy itself. Furthermore, this rediscovery has given pragmatism back its status as the 
‘perennial American philosophy’, because of the central role it attributes to experimenta-
tion, reflecting the typically American preference for action over reflection, for facts over 
theories and, above all, for results (Dickstein 1998: 7, 16). 
This new recognition is due in large part to the exhaustion of analytical philosophy, the 
materialist tendencies of logical positivism, the nihilistic sunset of hermeneutical philoso-
phy and the dead-end of postmodernity. In response to this context in recent years, various 
philosophers —both in Europe and America— have revitalized philosophical reflection on 
the basis of a rigorous reconstruction of the pragmatist legacy. Yet, it would appear that 
work remains to be done in reconstructing the moral philosophy of pragmatism. Part of this 
deficiency resides in the diversity existing amongst pragmatist thinkers, which prompted F. 
C. S. Schiller to claim that there were as many pragmatisms as pragmatists. While it is 
possible to trace a certain common method in their approaches to examining moral expe-
rience, it is also the case that the first impression that one receives on studying this field is 
that of a debate between mutually opposed positions, rather than a unified and homogenous 
discourse. 
With the intention of contributing to this task, in what follows I will offer a summary of 
what, de facto, the work of Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey contributes to ethical reflec-
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tion. Finally, in concluding, I will describe the synthesis that several authors have proposed 
as to what a pragmatist ethics ought to mean1
PEIRCE: THE IMPORTANCE OF HABITS 
. 
 I. The theory-practice divide 
Peirce insists on the separation of theory and practice (CP 1.618, 1.642, 1898)2
In morals Peirce appeals to instinct and sentiment, and in ethics he recommends the use 
of logical thinking —just as scientists do. However, even within the framework of his sys-
tem, it’s not obvious that scientists may so easily set aside their instincts —in fact, instinct 
(or ‘rational instinct’ as he called it in 1908) plays a significant role in the economy of re-
search. Moreover, the statement that in moral issues there may be no possibility of carrying 
out an inquiry that is truth-oriented is not an uncontroversial one. After all, moral inquiry is 
performed in a deliberative way, weighing up argumentations, beliefs and principles, and 
comparing them either with their probable or conceivable consequences or with lived as 
well as possible experiences that can be forceful or impinge upon the deliberative subject in 
such a way as to acquire the compulsory resistance due to reality. As Misak puts it succint-
ly, “the practice of moral deliberation is responsive to experience, reason, argument, and 
thought experiments… Such responsiveness is part of what it is to make a moral decision 
and part of what it is to try to live a moral life” (2000: 52)
, and 
emphasizes that ethics is a science worth studying only if it is not a matter of vital impor-
tance for he who studies it (CP 1.669, 1898). The practical man doesn’t need to put his as-
sertions to the test nor does he test his beliefs. Unlike him, the man of science accepts that 
reasoning and experimentation are analogous —both are inquiries into the sense of some-
thing, in both can the unexpected occur— and also admits that only experimental results 
can have a direct effect on human conduct. 
This separation of theory and practice runs parallel to another split, namely, that of eth-
ics and morals or, better put, of ethical theory and moral practice. Peirce denies that morali-
ty is subject to rationality and thinks that ethics is valuable as a science in a broad sense. 
But he also regards ethics as a science which bears on human conduct only indirectly, 
through the examination of past actions and the self-correction of the self in view of future 
action. In addition, ethics would be a normative knowledge only in so far as it analyzes the 
adjustment of actions to ends and in so far as it studies the general way in which a good life 
can be lived. 
3. Likewise, this same deliberative 
activity implies an effort to acquire habits, beliefs and principles that contribute to a truly 
free deliberation which, in turn, can result in creative conclusions. For Peirce, as you get 
more habit-governed, you become more creative and free, and your selfhood acquires plas-
ticity and receptiveness to experience4
                                                          
1 The terms ‘pragmatic’ and ‘pragmatist’ are used interchangeably here. Small differences between them 
could be pointed out, but since their use in ordinary language is almost equivalent, I will not pay attention to their 
nuances. 
2 Reference to Peirce’s papers are given as CP followed by volume, paragraph number, and the year written. 
See Peirce (1931-1958). 
3 Moral discussion is also comprised of experiences, examples, arguments and thought experiments which 
may be as compelling as compulsory and, therefore, may well account for the truth of the ethical hypothesis dis-
cussed (Misak 2000: 94). 
. 
4 In a certain sense, habits release time that can be employed in using imagination, which is the heart of crea-
tivity. Moreover, as Barrena (2001) says, “the creative power… rests in the capacity of exerting control over one-
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Vincent Colapietro has referred to Peirce’s description of human reason in terms of a 
deliberative rationality (1999: 24). Also, in another place he has explained that deliberation 
for Peirce is a process of preparation for future action which has to do with the checking of 
previous acts, the rehearsal in imagination of different roads to be followed by possible 
conduct and the nurturing of ideals (Colapietro 1997: 270, 281). It is precisely this experi-
ment carried out within imagination that generates habits, because, as Peirce says in “A 
Survey of Pragmaticism”, “it is not the muscular action but the accompanying inward ef-
forts, the acts of imagination, that produce the habit” (CP 5.479, 1907). 
Habits are regular ways of thinking, perceiving and interpreting that generate actions. 
As such, habits have a huge influence on human behavior, manifest themselves in the con-
crete things we do and, at the same time, are formed within those same activities. Even 
more, according to Peirce, 
 
the activity takes the form of experimentation in the inner world; and the conclusion (if it 
comes to a definite conclusion), is that under given conditions, the interpreter will have 
formed the habit of acting in a given way whenever he may desire a given kind of result. 
The real and living logical conclusion is that habit (CP 5.491, 1907). 
 
Much more evidence could be given to support the view that habits are virtually decided 
(CP 2.435, c.1893) and also that intelligence comprises inward or potential actions that in-
fluence the formation of habits (CP 6.286, 1893). Suffice it to say that, according to Peirce, 
deliberation is a function of the imagination, and that imagination is in itself an experiment 
which may have unexpected consequences that impose themselves upon the deliberative 
subject. 
II. Ethics as a normative science 
Although for a long time Peirce did not regard ethics as a subject worthy of serious 
study, he came to change his mind, especially at the turn of the century, when he tried out 
several classifications of the sciences and he assigned ethics to its place as one of the three 
normative sciences. 
I’ll spare you the details of Peirce’s classification of the sciences. Let’s just say for the 
moment that, because of its being part of philosophy, normative science is observational 
and based on ordinary experience. It studies phenomena in relation to ends, that is, pheno-
mena as dyadic. Also, as a part of philosophy, the normative sciences derive their principles 
from mathematics, that is, they make claims about how certain things ‘ought’ to be or hap-
pen hypothetically. In this sense, they don’t describe but prescribe “that if you want good-
ness in action, then…”, “if you want beauty in feeling, then…”, “if you want truth in think-
ing, then…”. 
In the case of ethics, if you want to obtain goodness in action then you should restrain 
your acts in certain ways (De Waal 2001: 19). For Peirce, this means that you should adjust 
your life to an ideal, namely, to the development of concrete reasonableness, to make a 
more intelligible world with our actions and thoughts. Ethics is not in charge of discovering 
this ultimate end, which is supplied by aesthetics, the science that defines the summum bo-
num which guides all actions. Ethics, then, would be merely the theory of the conformity of 
                                                                                                                                                   
self, of being rational, of integrating everything under reason through the development of habits. By means of ha-
bits, the human being makes all things rational, and submits the universe to his control in the case of science, his 
feelings in the case of art, or his own life in general [in the case of ethics]; that is, he adds reasonableness”. 
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an action to that ideal. The ideal doesn’t cause any action but prompts the revision of past 
actions and the judgment of future actions. The judgment that compares the action with the 
ideal gives rise to an influence on habits that, together with the consequences of past ac-
tions, modifies the future action. 
Therefore, for Peirce, every deliberate conduct implies the following: some ideal, an ac-
tion, the subsequent comparison of the act with the ideal and, finally, a judgment concern-
ing future conduct. Deliberate action is synonymous with free action, the kind of action that 
ethics can study, but in order to be a morally good action it has to be consistent with an ul-
timate end. 
III. Adjustment of conduct to an ideal 
Ethics for Peirce consists in rational deliberation about how to act in order to shape our 
lives to an ideal. This ideal is neither a socially inculcated one nor a historically or tradi-
tionally fixed one. Acting on such an ideal is not bad or wrong, it’s simply not-moral, be-
cause you don’t freely choose that end. Peirce has a lot of respect for tradition, instincts and 
inherited feelings because, even though they are not reflexive, they rule our conduct in a 
safe way and seek to preserve the community over the individual (Mayorga 2007). Parker 
has stressed that in this expansion of the range of driving forces for action Peirce succeeds 
in undoing the rationalistic dream of an ethical conduct completely ruled by reason. In fact, 
for Peirce, there’s no need to reason about every single action —it is neither possible nor 
even desirable to do so— because ‘individual ratiocination is highly fallible in matters of 
‘vital importance’’. Moreover, “compared to the errors of limited reason, instinct and sen-
timent are ‘practically infallible’ guides to ordinary affairs” (Parker 2003: 40-41). 
So, again, what exactly is this ultimate end of conduct? Ethics can only point to some 
features of this end, but cannot say exactly which one it is. Indeed, in this regard “Peirce’s 
definition of an ultimate ideal is obtained by a logical analysis of what is required for an 
ideal to be ultimate” (Sullivan 1977: 189). As a result, he concludes that a good end must 
be assumable and possible to achieve on a constant basis. In this sense, the rationalization 
of the universe is the only ultimate end that clarifies and gives sense to all our activities —
that includes thinking— because for the human being it is “the chance to understand him-
self and everything surrounding him” (Barrena and Nubiola 2007: 53) and, according to 
this, the chance to appropriate his own life. 
The development of reasonableness also entails, in part, the development of habits, on 
the part of the world and of ourselves —that the world is evolving towards a more habit-
ruled and ordered world is evident for Peirce; that we human beings can contribute to that 
evolution is also noticeable for him. The task of finding order in the world is in itself a part 
of making the world more intelligible. But this order isn’t easy to see. As Fontrodona 
wrote, since the ideal 
 
is the growth in concrete reasonableness, and this, in turn, is the development of habits, it 
follows that the perception of the world will depend on the habits held by the individual… 
Thus, the conclusion is reached that good is what appears as attractive to the sufficiently 
matured agent (2002: 188). 
 
So, as long as you become more refined, sensitive and responsive to experiencing habits 
you get to see more and more reasonableness everywhere. 
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DEWEY: EXPERIENCE AND DELIBERATION 
 
I’ll try to be even more succinct in outlining John Dewey’s moral philosophy, a robust 
piece of philosophical thinking sufficiently detailed in several scholarly books. Dewey be-
gins his ethical reflection by claiming that morally problematic situations arise when there 
are “ends so discrepant, so incompatible, as to require selection of one and rejection of the 
other” (MW 5: 194, 1908)5
a) it is social and affective, that is, transactional and qualitative. For Dewey there are no 
isolated moral subjects, but societies wherein agents interact. Also, moral qualities are ex-
perienced and can affect any person in a given situation, since these qualities belong to 
the situation as it is presented in experience and, in fact, they are objective features of 
. Moral experience is bound to not knowing what to do among 
several demands. When one considers the incompatibility of ends that are presented in ex-
perience, then experience enters the moral realm. As Hildebrand puts it, for Dewey a moral 
experience is linked with reflective thought in a “situation saturated by conflicting elements 
which demands that engaged agents determine reflectively what to value and what ends to 
pursue” (2008: 67). 
 According to Gregory Pappas, Dewey understands that a typical moral inquiry is 
constituted by three main stages: an agent that finds himself in a morally problematic situa-
tion, the same agent that engages in a process of moral deliberation and, finally, the mo-
ment in which he arrives at a judgment that results in a choice (Pappas 1998: 108). As far as 
this brief presentation is concerned, on the second phase of the moral inquiry Dewey writes 
that 
 
Deliberation is a process of active, suppressed, rehearsal; of imaginative dramatic per-
formance of various deeds carrying to their appropriate issues the various tendencies 
which we feel stirring within us… We give way, in our mind, to some impulse; we try, in 
our mind, some plan. Following its career through various steps, we find ourselves in 
imagination in the presence of the consequences that would follow; and as we then like 
and approve, or dislike or disapprove, these consequences, we find the original impulse or 
plan good or bad. Deliberation is dramatic and active, not mathematical and impersonal 
(MW 5: 292-293, 1908). 
 
Note that choice or decision is something that can be arrived at either personally or so-
cially. That is so, because for Dewey deliberation isn’t just a ‘cephalocentric’ soliloquy but 
also a communicative and socially engaged act (Fesmire 2003: 70-71, 82). Also, in delibe-
rating we not only imagine and reflect on the consequences for ourselves but also try to fig-
ure out the responses of others. To sum up, as Hildebrand explains, 
 
By trying out various courses of action in imagination, we not only map out logical possi-
bilities, we also evoke and make explicit our reaction; we test how we would feel if we 
did an action — what sort of person we would become. And while deliberation connotes a 
solitary act, much deliberation is actually social (2008: 78). 
 
Taken as a whole, Dewey’s reconstruction of moral experience also relies on the follow-
ing features (Pappas 2008: 181-183): 
 
                                                          
5 References to Dewey’s works follow the critical edition and use the following abbreviations: EW (The Early 
Works), MW (The Middle Works), and LW (The Later Works), followed by volume, page number, and the year 
written. 
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such situation. Undoubtedly, ‘moral qualities, traits, or values are sometimes experienced 
as objects of knowledge, but before this they are experienced as had, felt, or suffered’ 
(Pappas 1997: 541). 
b) it is situational and contextual. The context of a unique situation is what is truly ‘given’ 
at any time in experience and each situation constitutes a unique context (Pappas 1997: 
534, 537). Therefore, Dewey’s moral epistemology aims to solve the problem encoun-
tered in this situation (Anderson 2008), for ‘in’ a situation the agent is participator. It is in 
this sense that moral experience may turn into an effort to ameliorate situations and to 
bring new goods into existence. 
c) habits are the stable part of moral experience and also ‘are largely responsible for the 
continuity of conduct’ (Hildebrand 2008: 67). Habits embody the traits of a person’s 
character and also tend to become fixed features of the self. That’s why it’s so important 
to instill —by means of education— habits of independent thought, critical inquiry, ob-
servation, experimentation, foresight, and imagination, including sympathy for others 
(Anderson 2008). The proper cultivation of one’s character is the best way to establish a 
moral order, provided that one’s moral intelligence is constituted by habits such as sensi-
tivity, conscientiousness, sympathy and open-mindedness. 
d) it acknowledges the importance of using ideals, principles and habits intelligently. To 
be precise, for Dewey an ethical theory should serve as ‘an instrument for rendering de-
liberation more effective and hence choice more intelligent’ because, as he conceives it, it 
should ‘enlighten and guide choice and action by revealing alternatives… [including] 
what is entailed when we choose one alternative rather than another’ (LW 7: 316, 1932).  
e) it traces a distinction between immediate experience of value and reflective endorse-
ment of it. ’Valuing is immediate —value is felt as present in experience. Evaluating (also 
called ‘valuation’ by Dewey) is mediate or reflective —value is indeterminate and inquiry 
must endeavor to clarify the situation’ (Hildebrand 2008: 80). This latter operation of ap-
praising is the one that makes the agent conscious of moral goodness, as ‘a truly moral (or 
right) act is one which is intelligent in an emphatic and peculiar sense; it is a reasonable 
act. It is not merely one which is thought of, and thought of as good, at the moment of ac-
tion, but one which will continue to be thought of as ‘good’ in the most alert and persis-
tent reflection’ (MW 5: 278-279, 1908). 
 
Finally, let me say three more things about Dewey’s moral philosophy. First, the impor-
tant task to be done by educators in trying to foster habits that entail an intelligent rein-
forcement of the best practices and not mere repetition of unreflective customs. Second, for 
Dewey there may be nothing wrong in taking tradition into account, if we make an intelli-
gent use of it as a tool and provided that this same tradition does not lose its moral sensitivi-
ty towards unexpected situations and, therefore, render the improvement of its contents im-
possible. Third, Dewey does not reject the existence and effectiveness of ideals and ulti-
mate ends altogether. He only denies that these are static or fixed ones. Indeed, in A Com-
mon Faith he stressed that ideals exist as ends in an operative way: they exist in character, 
in personality and action (LW 9: 33, 1934). True, Dewey’s ethics copes with an ever-
changing environment, but still uses a broad moral criterion which is ‘growth’. 
 
The end is… the active process of transforming the existent situation. Not perfection as a 
final goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim in liv-
ing. Honesty, industry, temperance, justice, like health, wealth and learning, are not goods 
to be possessed as they would be if they expressed fixed ends to be attained. They are di-
rections of change in the quality of experience. Growth itself is the only moral ‘end’ (MW 
12: 181, 1920). 
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As Gouinlock puts it, “the end of human nature is growth —an integrated, socially re-
sponsible, ongoing development of the varying potentialities that emerge in the course of 
life… The good life is one of intelligent participation in processes of change” (1992: 260). 
As democracy is that way of life that encourages the arising of human potentialities, “a way 
of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature”, and which task 
“is forever that of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and 
contribute” (LW 14: 226, 230, 1939), it takes little to say that democracy as a way of life is 
a moral ideal worth achieving. Although, to be sure, Dewey does not outline how this ideal 
must be specified in particular institutions and customs beyond some general recommenda-
tions6
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A PRAGMATIST ETHICS 
. 
In addressing the question of what exactly pragmatist ethics is, the first thing that we 
note is that there is still no accepted consensus concerning this potential ethical theory. In 
fact, discussion is still ongoing concerning the very possibility of a pragmatist ethical 
theory, since pragmatism is not based upon antecedent principles (it is not a doctrine that is 
deduced after establishing a set of foundations) and, further, there is no single independent 
and explicitly formulated pragmatist ethical theory as such. The most that seems deducible, 
on the basis of a superficial approach to pragmatism, is that there are as many ethical theo-
ries as there are particular experiences, since any “meaningful theory cannot exist apart 
from practice’ and ‘theorizing is not prior to or independent of experience, but [rather] 
grows out and is part of experience” (LaFollette 2000: 418). This explains why, instead of 
proposing a specific theory, pragmatism describes itself as a method for understanding bet-
ter —or reconstructing— already existing theories, and more generally, as a method that 
enables greater awareness of our actual moral life. 
Hence, it can be posited that the key concepts of pragmatism in ethics are the notions of 
habit and deliberation, elements which are also present in the real moral life of every per-
son, and which other ethical theories have studied under other names (virtue, custom, ten-
dency, disposition, dilemma, decision). This signifies, at the very least, that “any theorizing 
[…] begins from current wisdom, as embodied in our habits” (LaFollette 2000: 418, em-
phasis added). Since, however, there are no pre-established principles for pragmatism, but 
only experience, the norms of acting are established by each person thanks to the activity of 
deliberation —of making a ‘dramatic rehearsal’ (MW 5: 292-293, 1908) of the possible 
consequences of each course of action— and also thanks to the capacity to adopt as one's 
own certain determined habits or dispositions for action. In this respect, Peirce is a most 
radical thinker, since for him concepts, beliefs, associations of ideas —and, it might be 
added, norms— are not created by us beforehand, but rather are caused by our experiences. 
Our life experiences determine our concepts and, as a result, we eventually arrive at our be-
liefs concerning reality, since the ‘course of life’ or totality of our experience is more or 
less homogenous. Life, in sum, forces the creation of our mental habits, since experience 
always influences our way of thinking and acting. 
In addition, pragmatists include projection (Faerna 1996: 92) within the ambit of expe-
rience; that is to say, experience has value not only as a starting point for our concepts, but 
also, above all, as that which makes possible new courses of action. “True reality”, as Nu-
                                                          
6 This invalidates much of Robert Talisse’s criticism of a supposed totalitarian or anti-pluralistic current in 
Dewey’s views. See Hildebrand 2008b. 
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biola has written, “is, then, the field of projection of experience which the members of so-
ciety share via their communicative activities” (Nubiola 1996: 1141). We access projected 
experience in an indirect fashion, but it nevertheless has a real status, because it can be 
shared, communicated, brought about, and can be the impetus for concrete actions. Thus, it 
is integrated into general experience, being experience a contact with something that im-
poses itself upon me despite myself, and which I am forced to accept prior to theorizing 
(Pappas 2007: 329). Reality itself is a ‘field of projection’, which causes reflection, delibe-
ration, communication and prediction to become fundamental activities for practical life, in 
interaction with the world, since they are activities derived from experience, and which 
project onto experience the various options available in acting or thinking. 
Nevertheless, despite this shared emphasis on the value of habits and deliberation, the 
differences in approach between the various pragmatist authors are clear and well-known. 
As a result, the most typical strategy among scholars has been to base themselves upon one 
or another pragmatist author, and from that perspective develop a general ethical theory 
which is sufficiently broad and plausible that it can take into account the thought of the oth-
er thinkers in the pragmatist school. For this reason, the bibliography available up to the 
present has been based primarily on the thought of Dewey or the social psychology of 
Mead, although it at times mentions James and Peirce. The descriptions of the thought of 
these authors are generally more or less accurate, but their characterization of ‘pragmatist 
ethics’ tends to be vague and minimal. Nevertheless, there are indisputable points of 
agreement between these pragmatists, in particular the consideration of ethics as a science 
which is characterized by objectivity, cognitivism, teleology and naturalism. 
I. Experience as an objective and cognitive starting point 
Thus, for example, Tiles has identified a series of components of the ethical philosophy 
of pragmatism, decanting it from the general characteristics of pragmatist thought (Tiles 
1998: 640). These characteristics are, first of all, the rejection of certainty in the search for 
precepts and moral principles, and therefore the rejection of moral absolutes. Certainly, this 
characteristic is connatural to pragmatism and to Peirce, since, indeed, certainty or subjec-
tive assurance concerning a scientific hypothesis, or, in this case, a moral precept, does not 
add anything whatsoever to its truth or goodness. The fact that pragmatism rejects the pos-
sibility of moral absolutes means, first of all, that it rejects the possibility of moral prin-
ciples which are not connected to experience. Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that pragmat-
ism succumbs to relativism, since, as Ruth Anna Putnam has stated, “all evaluations are 
firmly rooted in and are correctible by experience” (Putnam 1992: 1105). Experience cor-
roborates assessments and valuations because it is objective and general, i.e., it is uniform, 
common to everyone, social and shared7. In the case of ethics —where we do not always 
know with certainty the consequences of our decisions, judgments and moral hypotheses— 
one must frequently recur to imagination, memory and thought as clues to experience8
                                                          
7 Indeed, although sometimes it is presented as a changing reality, “experience is the constant, persistent and 
trustworthy basis of evidence in any philosophical investigation which is empirical” (Pappas 2007: 327). 
8 This is not to say that the issues discussed in ethics are abstract or indefinite, but only that ‘moral judgments 
require more collateral information’, which sometimes can consist in a certain experience or specific background 
knowledge (Misak 2000: 92, 82-83). 
, but 
there is also something objective here, given that imagination is also experiential and 
shared; i.e. we all more or less imagine in the same way. 
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In conjunction with this, in second place, is the affirmation that we are dealing with a 
finalist ethics, which requires self-control in view of an end. This characteristic derives 
from the deference which pragmatism normally shows to the scientific method, and, more 
generally, from the conception of thought as an activity with an end, where the obtaining of 
any cognitive objective (such as that of truth) inevitably brings with it the requirement of 
refining the control which we exercise over our actions. Science itself, for Peirce, is a cog-
nitive disposition, since it consists principally in the desire to learn (Cantens 2006: 94-95). 
According to Tiles, pragmatism employs scientific research as a model of how to respond 
to moral problems, and therefore it demands the same virtues of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘im-
partiality’ (which characterize the scientific researcher) in order to reach moral judgments 
(1998: 640)9
II. How to describe and prescribe a certain behavior 
. Both in science and in ethics, the search for truth demands a behavior charac-
terized by openness to error and refutation. This ultimately means that ethics is a field of 
knowledge that seeks objectivity; that is, ethical propositions are objective because they can 
be mistaken (Lynch 2004: 11, 22, 34). Further, this implies that ethics carries with it a cer-
tain type of cognitivism, in the sense that moral statements express propositions and beliefs, 
and therefore may be judged true or false (Van Roojen 2005). If, in the context of Peirce's 
philosophy, we were to go further, uniting this cognitive disposition to the disposition to 
learn – that is, of proposing hypotheses that can be corrected by experience – ethics would 
then be a fully rational science, since it would follow the first rule of reason, which is the 
desire to learn (CP 1.135, 1898). 
Up to this point, therefore – as González-Castán has summarized the issue – a pragmat-
ist ethics is recognizable by its insistence on the agent's point of view, and that reality re-
mains to be brought about; by its emphasis on the fact that moral conflict demands imagina-
tive solutions; and by its avoidance of relativism through its appeal to the experience accu-
mulated by the community. A further distinction of pragmatist ethics is its claim that de-
sires and necessities are not something given and unchangeable, but that they are instead 
created (González-Castán 2001: 220-221, 226, 231, 235). The final characteristic of prag-
matist ethics, as identified by Tiles, is along the same lines: it is a naturalistic ethics “in 
which claims about human nature function as norms” (Tiles 1998: 640) but in which it is 
not assumed that human desires are fixed, and in which, finally, the solutions proposed to 
moral conflicts must be evaluated by their consequences. 
Nevertheless, this does not make pragmatist ethics a consequentialist theory, but rather 
– as Liszka has demonstrated – a teleological one. Consequentialist ethics, in fact, does not 
imply movement towards an end, but rather the maximization of a certain or of certain con-
sequences. Pragmatist ethics is teleological, but in a special sense, where the end which is 
valued is neither imposed from without nor comes from within, but rather is discovered and 
developed in process (Lizska 2005), in the human practices which constitute the moral life. 
It is, further, a teleological ethics molded by habits and norms which are corrected by 
experience, and thus, “even if the capacity for a habit is immanent to an organism, habits 
are not. They are formed in the interstices between organism and its habitat” (Lizska 2005). 
                                                          
9 In a passage from Peirce’s later works, he approaches a similar position when he explains that the attitude of 
the scientist, and his particular task, does not consist in confirming his prior beliefs, but rather in seeking out the 
errors and insufficiencies in them. The logic which is employed by the person reasoning in scientific research is, 
therefore, irrevocably linked to a concrete interior attitude, and to an ethics of ‘justice’ and ‘impartiality’ with re-
gard to evidence and new arguments which may go counter to previously held beliefs (CP 6.3, 1898).  
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Habits, therefore, are not simply the revealing of an inherent nature, but rather the result of 
a process of interaction and learning. Further, that which legitimates a normative claim (of 
the kind ‘I should…’) is not that its derivation from some human essence, but rather the fact 
that it leads to the desired end in a reliable manner (Lizska 2007). 
The approaches of Liszka and Tiles coincide in adopting the model of successful scien-
tific research as the way of developing a pragmatist ethics. Inspired by this option, – which 
appears to reconcile the perspectives of Dewey and Peirce – Liszka has proposed that 
pragmatist ethics is at once descriptive and normative. On the one hand, following Peirce 
(CP 1.409, c.1890), it would be a theory that recognizes the fact that all phenomena tend to 
self-regulate, that in all things there is a tendency to acquire habits, to behave in a regular 
manner. Translated to the sphere of ethics, this means that moral habits tend to acquire the 
form of laws or norms for the individual. In fact, moral habits can be seen as a repertory of 
inherited actions and behaviors which permit the person to confront the moral life, and 
which are only questioned when they are unable to help the person to handle new situations 
and internal or external conflicts (it is then that genuine moral deliberation begins, and new 
habits can arise) (Lizska 2005). In addition, self-regulation is complemented by a second 
descriptive aspect, i.e. that norms derive from the struggles of communities of moral agents 
to choose the best norms (or correct existing norms). 
Nevertheless, certain criteria of evaluation are necessary, in order to judge the moral 
norms and new habits which may arise as a result of conflict and deliberation. Following 
the scheme of ‘fixation of habits’ suggested by Liszka, the fact that a norm may be domi-
nant or resistant is no guarantee that it is correct to adopt it; rather, it is necessary that it be 
fixed in accordance with certain criteria. Drawing a parallel between the fixation of beliefs 
and the fixation of moral habits, it can be concluded that those habits which become fixed 
due to exclusion, authoritarian domination or dogmatic legislation allow us to discard cer-
tain dominant norms. In addition, as in science, a norm can be discarded if ‘the sample’ is 
small, i.e. if it does not include or draw together a significant quantity of experiences. 
Therefore, “the more inclusive the norming process [is], the more likely the results will be 
the right norm” (Lizska 2005). In this sense, a norm is not legitimated because it is concep-
tually consistent, but rather because it functions in practice, that is, because it can be trans-
lated into practice and have consequences (Lizska 2007). 
It is true, however, that these affirmations are not strictly Peircean. On the one hand, as 
Misak has shown, a norm is not discarded because it is applicable only in a small number of 
cases, but rather because it encounters opposition nearly every time it is applied. Doing A, 
therefore, is correct if, in the long term, it is the option which brings about the least surprise 
(Misak 2004: 110). Further, on the other hand, from a Peircean perspective, the legitimacy 
of a norm does not derive from its practical equivalencies, but rather from its capacity to 
promote habits in the long term. The variety of practical consequences will be realized, in 
any case, in the different ways in which, in his behavior, the human person incarnates the 
ultimate ideal which should orient all his actions (Barrena and Nubiola 2007: 54).  
III. On the role of ends in pragmatist ethics 
Therefore, by asserting that norms are valid if they are translatable into practice, Liszka 
borders on a functionalism very similar to the thesis of Dewey, which – far from discredit-
ing his proposal – shows how difficult it is to shed the Deweyian legacy when discussing 
pragmatist ethics. Peirce never went into such detail in the few texts he wrote on ethics; in-
deed, in order to acquire the status of a science, for Peirce ethics would have to be ‘anteth-
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ics’ (CP 1.573, 1906), i.e. that which is prior to ethics as it is normally understood, and 
which studies merely the conformity of the action to an ideal (the determination of this 
ideal is not the ethicist's task). Nevertheless, if this ideal of action is regarded as something 
fixed and ‘final’, it would appear that, once it is achieved, action would come to an end. But 
the moral life teaches us that ends, rather than constituting goals which put an end to action, 
perform the function of orienting it and giving it meaning; they make action intelligible, 
and at the same time, are the principle of new actions10
This occurs in this way because, in our actual moral life, our objectives can always be 
achieved in a more full way; we can always improve the way in which we carry out our ac-
tions. LaFollette similarly blurs the line between ends and means, and emphasizes how, on 
many occasions, actions which are normally regarded as merely means to an end already 
constitute that end, since they are realizing that end (LaFollette 2000: 410-412). For him, 
pragmatist ethics has four essential characteristics. In the first place, it is an ethics which 
employs criteria without being criteriological; that is, it does not maintain that moral crite-
ria are logically anterior, nor that they are fixed, complete and directly applicable (LaFol-
lette 2000: 400-401). It may use other ethical theories as criteria, but the vital issue for 
pragmatist ethics is deliberation. In second place, pragmatist ethics is objective without be-
ing absolute; that is, it recognizes that some moral habits are better than others, but at the 
same time it admits that we are fallible, because we do not always know which moral habit 
is better (LaFollette 2000: 415) and, therefore, we seek objectivity by comparing our ac-
tions with our acquired habits and our experience (LaFollette 2000: 409-410)
. Therefore, if (as was stated earlier) 
pragmatist ethics attempts to treat of our actual moral life, it is not in the discovery and cla-
rification of ends that the essence of pragmatist ethics is to be discovered; rather, such eth-
ics pays attention to any voluntary action and, more generally, to all courses of action 
which pursue an end in a consistent way over a prolonged period of time – as Peirce wrote 
(CP 5.135, 1903). 
11
BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
. In third 
place, for LaFollette, pragmatist ethics recognizes that ethical judgments are relative, be-
cause they derive from the interests of the agent and from the educational and instructional 
process which produces the morality of each person. But, at the same time, it is not relativ-
ist, because it admits that virtually any behavior can affect the interests of others, and that 
therefore there are better and worse habits (LaFollette 2000: 407). Finally, pragmatist ethics 
is pluralist without being indecisive. It tolerates and welcomes certain moral differences 
because it admits that, on certain occasions, various habits may appear to be equally good 
and, if there is disagreement, the best way to resolve it is to put these habits to the test in an 
environment which encourages open discussion (LaFollette 2000: 416-417). 
As LaFollette presents it, the key to understanding pragmatist ethics is that it is not an 
ethical theory per se, but rather it is an anthropology, a way of understanding the human 
                                                          
10 In fact, it is hard to determine what kind of action a ‘final’ action would be. Even in a specific course of ac-
tion, it is difficult to point out which single deed would be the one that brings the whole action to an end. This is so 
because, as British writer G. K. Chesterton rightly saw, ‘all we do is preparations’. That is, every action is always 
preliminary to something else, each act always gives way to several other deeds, and no single act in itself coin-
cides with the end of a given action. Perhaps, as Chesterton wrote on several occasions, the only acts that bring 
action to an end (metaphorically speaking, as we in fact are always acting) are the ones based on unreflective cus-
tom, such as those belonging to madmen and lunatics (Chesterton 2004: 295-296). 
11 In the same way, when discussing values and evaluating them, Misak has emphasized that we do not begin 
from an abstract definition, but rather from our experience of them (Misak 2000: 81). 
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being and his moral action. Therefore, pragmatist ethics in reality does not propose a new 
ethical theory, but rather “reconstructs” through a new prism the basic intuitions of the best 
ethical theories. The fundamental element on which the attention of pragmatist ethics cen-
ters is deliberation. Deliberation is not directly responsible for directing action, but only 
does so indirectly, by means of a critique of past actions, the effort to correct or reinforce 
certain habits and mental experiments that each actor performs in order to determine his 
own future conduct, and even to determine in a general manner the way in which one wish-
es to live one’s life (or, what amounts to the same thing, the type of person one wishes to 
be). The task of a pragmatist ethics, therefore, is not to provide final solutions, but rather to 
indicate that it is only via the testing and communication of experiences that the superiority 
of one moral idea over another can be demonstrated. In this sense, one of the principal mis-
sions of any given version of pragmatist ethics is to indicate some general manner in which 
habits can be acquired which, later, will facilitate personal deliberation – both internal and 
external – in the broad variety of circumstances which make up the moral life. 
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